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ABSTRACT 
 
Franchising is a major trend in the hotel industry. Despite the fact that almost two thirds of 
branded hotels in the US are franchised there is a distinct lack of empirical research on 
franchising in the hospitality industry. In this article we have reviewed one of the most relevant 
lines of research in franchising literature usually referred as franchising and the society, and we 
have concentrated on analyzing one of the most controversial issues in this line of research: the 
territorial rights in hotel franchising contracts. The paper identifies the main sources of conflict 
when dealing with territorial rights in hotel franchising contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 franchise system is a collaboration agreement between two independent business parts, the 
franchisor and the franchisee, whereby the franchisor allows the franchisee the right to use his 
brand name, products and services, and specific know-how in exchange for direct or indirect 
payments to the franchisor by the franchisee. In other words, the franchise system ―consists of multiple 
organizations that are legally independent, economically interdependent, and operationallyindistinguishable to 
consumers‖ (Parsa 1996). 
 
The success of the franchise system is reflected in its spectacular growth figures. In the US where the 
franchising system began in the early 20
th
 century, there are over 3,000 companies involved in franchising, 
accounting for over 10% of GDP and an estimated 30% of retail sales.  
 
In the hotel industry the franchising system is also constantly growing. According to Mintel Marketing 
Intelligence 2005 International Hotel Industry Report, 67% of US room capacity is branded, mainly through 
franchise contracts. Almost all the big US hotel chains are involved in franchising, eighteen of the top twenty US 
hotel brands use franchising, so franchising has become a hot topic of interest in the hotel industry. The situation is 
different in Europe where the franchising system is less popular and the hotel chains still prefer to grow via leasing 
or management contracts instead of franchising.  
 
Asked about the different behavior of the European and the US hotel markets concerning franchising, our 
two European experts expressed similar opinions. Mr. Jordi Frigola, Senior Vice President Jones Lang LaSalle 
Europe, explained that ―In Europe the level of concentration and branding is very low compared to the US. Most of 
the European hotel chains prefer the leasing contracts. And also the investors prefer a lease contract with no risks 
than hands on franchising contracts.‖ Mr. Bernardo Cabot, Director of Expansion European Division of Sol Melia, 
on a similar vein added that ―There are three potential barriers to the development of franchising in the European 
hotel industry: (1) a lack of potential franchisees with both the necessary skills and the financial resources needed; 
(2) a great concern about the quality standards of the potential franchisees and how to enforce the chains quality 
standards in the franchisee’s property: (3) litigation and other  legal issues involved in the franchise contract‖. 
 
In parallel with the rapid expansion of franchising, there is a growing interest among academics and 
practitioners in studying the franchise system. The literature on franchising has followed three major lines of 
research: franchising and the society, creating franchise systems and managing a franchise system. In this paper we 
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will concentrate on analyzing the line of research known as franchising and the society. We will do that by 
reviewing the relevant literature on the subject and by confronting what the theiry says with the opinions of our 
panel of experts and also with the empirical information collected from public sources of information regarding the 
hotel industry.  
 
I.  FRANCHISING AND THE SOCIETY 
 
Within the line of investigation referred to as ―franchising and the society‖ researchers have looked at the 
franchising issue from the viewpoint of public policy and considered the effect of franchising on the society as a 
whole. In her seminal article Hunt (1977) explained what she called the ―promise‖ of franchising, that is the 
purported benefits of franchising to society in general, to franchisees, and to franchisors.  The research question in 
this case is whether, in general, franchising offers any kind of benefit to the society.  
 
Franchising advocates maintain that society in general should benefit from franchising because of the lower 
failure rates for franchised business compared to independent ones. The purported lower failure rates result in a 
better assignment of economic resources and so a benefit to society in general.  
 
Business failure is of great significance to society and prospective entrepreneurs; the US Dept. of 
Commerce data suggest that 67% of the new business discontinued in the first five years. On the other hand, the 
alleged lower failure rates are one of the main selling arguments for attracting potential franchisees to the franchise 
system. But, are the failure rates really lower? The empirical evidence is not clear. Back in 1977 Hunt reported that 
―(They) could find no solid evidence that franchisees have either a better or poorer chance for business survival than 
do similarly qualified independent entrepreneurs‖.  
 
Published investigations have reported mixed results to the question of franchising failure rate. Ayling 
(1988) found that franchising has a lower failure rate than that of independent business, but Bates (1995) reported 
opposite evidence, finding that failure rates among franchisees were higher than among independent businesses. 
Other empirical studies have found that the failure rate varies by industry and that franchisees of older chains had 
higher failure rates.  
 
Despite the unclear evidence, many people assume that franchisors are selling a formula for success, and 
the general perception is that franchisees have more chances of survival than independent businesses, as explained 
by Fulop and Forward (1997) ―despite the lack of convincing statistics that franchising is less risky for franchisees 
than operating an independent business, it has been pointed out that banks are prepared to offer preferential loans to 
franchisees based on their experience that franchising lowers the risk of failure.‖ 
 
II.  FRANCHISING AND THE SOCIETY: THE CASE OF THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 
 
In the hotel industry the situation is mainly the same, it is not clear whether the failure rates for franchised 
hotels is lower than that of independent hotels. Despite the fact that according to the Dun & Bradstreet Corporation 
reports, the lodging industry has consistently maintained lower failure rates than the average US business failure 
rates, there is no clear evidence of the effect of franchising on the propensity to failure or survival. In a study of 
hotel failure rates in the US, Ingram and Baum (1997) found that the chances of survival were higher for chain 
affiliated hotels than for independent hotels.  
 
In the restaurant industry, Parsa et.al. (2005) found that among franchised chains the failure rate was 57 
percent over the first three years of operation, and among independent restaurants the rate was 4 percent higher – 61 
percent. Despite the reported empirical evidence, in the hotel industry, as in the rest of the businesses, the general 
perception is that the failure rate of the franchised business is lower than the one of an independent operation.  
 
As one hotel franchisee pointed out in a conversation with the author: ―I don’t know if the failure rate is 
higher or lower, but having a brand behind you gives you some advantages over the independent operator‖. It seems 
that there is an agreement in the hotel industry about the importance of the brand to the success of a franchised hotel.  
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As Jordi Frigola, Senior Vice President Jones Lang LaSalle Europe pointed ―In my experience valuing 
hotels, the fact that the hotel has a franchised contract is not what is important, what most influences the value of the 
property is the effect of the brand on the property’s results, (…), being a franchisee you are going to pay the 
franchisor brand a 8-10% of your revenues, (…),  there are brands that really payback, but there are many others that 
do not, (…), I have seen franchising brands that only provided a 5% of the property’s reservations, that clearly does 
not payback the fees and royalties paid to the brand.‖ 
 
Other issues that come under the franchising and the society literature are: the amount of information the 
franchisor is obliged to give a potential franchisee, the termination provisions in the franchise contract, legal aspects 
and court interpretations of franchise contracts, the effect of franchise contracts on free competition, the pricing and 
product policy imposed by the franchisor— usually the franchisor require the franchisee to maintain a specified 
price policy and the franchisee can only sell goods or services approved by the franchisor—, and the territorial rights 
in the franchise contracts .  
 
Of the topics listed above, one has drawn major interest in the franchising hotel industry that is the 
definition of exclusivity sales areas in the franchise contracts and the impact when the franchisor opens a competing-
brand or same-brand hotel in the franchisee’s trading area.  
 
Interestingly most of the franchising hotel chains do not grant exclusivity rights in their franchising 
contracts, and this is often a cause of conflict between franchisor and franchisee, as it is illustrated in the case of 
Choice Hotels (Khana, 1995): ―The franchise contract provides no territorial rights or other promises of market 
allocation and did not restrict the franchisor from engaging in any business activity at any location other than the 
franchisee’s hotel, regardless of proximity to the hotel… Though the opening of another Choice franchise near a 
particular franchisee’s hotel did not constitute illegal action on the basis of the contract, some franchisees felt 
betrayed by such action‖.  
 
In a study conducted by Kalnins (2005) he found that when franchisors approve new same-brand hotels in 
the vicinity of existing hotels, these new hotels do indeed cannibalize the incumbents’ revenue, causing a loss of 
almost 3 percent of the typical hotel mean revenues, still, a competing brand’s entry causes lower revenue loses and 
there is no impact when company-owned chains open same-brand properties. So, there is a reason for franchisees to 
complain, even when the impact of a same-brand opening does not seem to be great enough to risk the franchisees’ 
survival, the franchisor must consider this effect.  
 
What franchising hotel chains are doing to prevent conflicts is informing existing franchisees of 
applications for new franchises that could impact their hotels, and giving them an opportunity to contest such 
applications. That is the case of Choice Hotels, as explained by Joseph Lavin, ex Senior Vice President 
Development Choice Hotels: ―There are two ways in which objections are raised: First, the franchisee simply writes 
a letter indicating objection; second, the franchisee files a formal objection and fills a comprehensive form 
indicating reasons why impact exists. Franchisees are also allowed to retain one of several entities that will conduct 
an impact study for them. Of all new deals, about 14% generate a formal objection form franchisees. Of these, 30% 
go to the study process, and we (the franchisor) prevail in 65% of the cases. However, in addition to that, we turn 
down plenty of applications, often on the grounds of impact. In fact, of the deals made by competing chains, 35% 
are such that we can’t even enter the negotiations, since it’s an obvious impact situation‖.  
 
In a later conversation with the author, Mr Lavin explained that in his experience with Marriott franchisees, 
the situation was different: ―At Marriott, we had about 300 franchisees, at Choice there were more than 1,500, and 
even when neither Choice nor Marriott gives territorial rights, Marriott experienced less conflicts with their 
franchisees than Choice in similar situations, …, Marriott works like a family with its franchisees. Marriott prefers a 
relatively small number of franchisees, doing multiple deals, which makes it easier to develop trust and have less 
conflict like the typical territory claim, but territory rights are always a source of conflict for any franchising hotel 
chain‖.  
 
Therefore it seems that the territorial rights will continue to be an issue of conflict between franchisors and 
franchisees, specially considering that the royalties that the franchisor receives from the franchisee are a percentage 
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of sales, not profit, so the economic incentive for the franchisor is to give as much licenses as he can to increase 
sales volume even when franchisees profits may be exposed. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Franchising is a major trend in the hotel industry. Despite the fact that almost two thirds of branded hotels 
in the US are franchised there is a distinct lack of empirical research on franchising in the hospitality industry. The 
line of investigation referred to as franchising and the society includes a topic that is highly relevant to the 
hospitality industry: territorial rights in franchised contracts. The hospitality industry is one of the few industries 
where the franchisor will rarely grant exclusivity in the franchising contract. All the hotel industry experts contacted 
by the author noted that territorial rights are a source of constant conflict between franchisor and franchisees. How 
to manage this source of conflict is still an unsolved question in the industry and is a very attractive research 
question for future investigations. 
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